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Abstract 
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whether asymmetric information and financing constraints or managerial discretion are the source of 
excess sensitivity of investment to cash flow. We estimate an accelerator model with additional cash 
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1. Introduction 
 
The positive contribution of public enterprises to the post-war development of some 
European economies, such as France and Italy, is well documented (see, for example, Kumar, 
1990, Vernon and Aharoni 1981 and Prodi 1976). This is in contrast to the equally well-
documented  poor performance of state-owned firms in the last decades, not only in those 
economies, but also in transition and developing ones. One  important element contributing 
to these poor results is the possible collusion, perceived on the increase in the last decades, 
between public managers and politicians (see, for example, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). 
In this paper we look at collusion as an abuse of managerial discretion1  on the part of 
public enterprises’ managers and we investigate its impact on public firms’ investment.  If 
managers and politicians collude, vote-maximising objectives rather than the maximisation of 
social welfare drive public investment. Therefore, collusion (or corruption) result in wasteful, 
sub-optimal investment2.  From a policy perspective, understanding what affects public firms’   
investment is important for two reasons. On one side, the dynamics and constraints of public 
investment play a crucial role in development and growth, especially in developing and 
transition economies. On the other, investigating how financial factors affect public firms’ 
investment - and in what they differ from private firms’ - is relevant for an understanding of 
what incentives could improve their performance, of the regulatory mechanisms for privatized 
utilities and the potential effects of privatization. 
The aim of this study is to provide an empirical analysis of the effects of managerial 
discretion on investment decisions by analysing the sensitivity of investment to cash flow for 
a panel of Italian public firms.  The study is, therefore, a contribution to the debate on the 
source of capital market imperfections that might be responsible for the well-documented 
evidence of a positive correlation between investment and cash flows, holding constant 
investment opportunities.  To our knowledge this is the first study that enlarges that debate to 
public enterprises. And the study of public enterprises is of great interest since, as discussed 
in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1998), the State is, after individual families, the 
most important large shareholder in most economies. 
                                                          
1 “Managerial discretion is the ability of managers to choose and pursue objectives and strategies that differ 
from those of the owners” (Aharoni, 1981, p.184). We consider taxpayers to be the owners of public firms 
(see Section 3).  
2 See Stultz (1990) for wasteful investment in private firms. 
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Our methodology consists in drawing from financial economics the framework in 
which to study the financing of investment and the relationship between investment and cash 
flow.  We then complement that approach with a discussion of how to think of the 
peculiarities of the investment decisions and managerial discretion of public enterprises. We 
also discuss the importance of the budget regime in which public enterprises operate. In the 
empirical work we identify a switch from a soft to a hard budget regime in 1987, which 
allows us to carry out a natural experiment. Moreover we analyse the interactions of the two 
budget regimes with different stages of the business cycle. The econometric investigation is 
carried out using a new dataset and a detailed analysis of the relevant Italian institutions. 
The paper is divided into eight sections. Section 2 describes the theoretical framework 
for analysis of the correlation between investment and cash flows of private firms.  Section 3 
investigates how investment decisions and managerial discretion differ between private and 
public firms.  Section 4 puts these differences in the context of Italian institutions and 
discusses soft and hard budget constraints. Section 5 includes our empirical model and 
Section 6 a description of the dataset. Section 7 presents the empirical results. Section 8 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. The theoretical framework for the analysis of company investment 
 
 Recent microeconometric literature has refocused attention on the determinants of 
company investment decisions under the assumption of imperfect capital markets (see the 
seminal work by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988). Information economics and agency 
theory have provided the theoretical foundations to explain why investment turns out to be 
highly correlated with cash flow or other measures of internal finance, after controlling for 
future investment (profit) opportunities3.  
 The theoretical framework for this paper draws from three strands of this literature. 
The first explains the investment-cash flow relationship in terms of financial constraints 
arising in imperfect capital markets when investors are less informed than managers about the 
quality of the investment project (Myers and Majluf, 1984). With asymmetric information, 
costly monitoring and contract enforcement problems, a premium is added to the (unique) 
                                                          
3 On the importance to control for future profit opportunities in investment equations, see Nickell (1978), 
Schiantarelli (1996) and Hubbard (1998).   
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perfect markets cost of capital, and internal and external funds are no longer perfect 
substitutes. By signalling a decrease in internal net worth, a decrease in current cash flow 
raises the shadow cost of capital, tightening the financing constraints. This discourages 
investment and leads to under-investment. The implied prediction of this framework is a 
positive relationship between investment and internal finance.   So far, most of the empirical 
work in this area has found supporting evidence for this positive relationship by investigating 
the investment behaviour of sub-samples of firms selected to be a priori more likely to face 
capital-market frictions4. In general, empirical findings are consistent with the idea that 
financing constraints are more binding (revealing a higher correlation between investment and 
internal finance) for firms which tend to be relatively smaller, younger, with lower dividend 
pay-out, independent (i.e. not affiliated with business groups or banks), more technologically 
innovative, with less concentrated ownership5. 
 The second interpretation of the excess sensitivity of investment to cash flow 
highlights the agency problems arising from the misalignment of managers’ interests and 
shareholders’ objectives (Jensen e Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1982). As suggested 
by Jensen (1986)’s “free cash flow theory”, if managers are more interested in growth, empire 
building and private benefits, they invest cash flow in excess of what is needed to finance 
positive net present value projects rather than paying out dividends to shareholders. In this 
framework, for firms where the agency problems are most severe, the observed positive 
correlation between investment and cash flow “could reflect managers’ decisions to ignore 
signals from market valuation in favour of over-investment in growth6” (Hubbard, Kashyap 
and Whited, 1995, p. 685).  
 Interestingly, both theories share the view that internal and external finance are 
imperfect substitutes. Both predict that changes in internal resources forecast changes in 
investment spending, holding constant firm opportunity. Both assume that higher leverage 
implies more risk of financial distress and more risk of bankruptcy. However, they differ on 
                                                          
4 For a critical assessment of the methodology of splitting the sample according to ex-ante criteria, see 
Schiantarelli (1996) and Hubbard (1998). See also Kaplan and Zingales (1997) who criticise the dividend 
pay-out criteria used by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), and  Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1996) 
for a reply.   
5 See Bond, Elston, Mairesse and Mulkay (1997), Mulkay (1997), Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1996), 
Chirinko and Schaller (1995), for recent empirical evidence. 
6 This argument has been used by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) to describe the investment decisions of 
“financially unconstrained” companies. See also Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited (1995), Carpenter (1995) 
and Gugler (1997) for other attempts to discriminate between the two hypotheses.  
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the source of the capital markets imperfections. The “financing constraints/asymmetric 
information” hypothesis focuses on hidden information problems, whereas the “managerial 
discretion” view focuses on agency/incentive problems resulting from the separation of 
ownership and control. As a consequence, although they both predict a wedge between the 
cost of internal and external funds, the cost of external finance is too high for the asymmetric 
information view, whereas the cost of internal finance is too low for the managerial 
discretion/agency cost explanation7.  Hence, from the observed excess sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow, the former predicts under-investment and the latter over-investment 
and possibly waste. 
The third approach to the study of the correlation of investment and cash flow is 
rooted in the recent literature on the micro-foundations of macroeconomics that has 
investigated the role of imperfect capital markets for investment over the business cycle (see 
Gertler and Hubbard, 1988; Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996). The main purpose of this 
literature is to analyse the channels of transmission of monetary policy. Whenever, following 
a monetary tightening or a downturn of the business cycle, a negative shock to the firm’s 
future prospects reduces its internal net worth, the terms of credit deteriorate and the firm cuts 
back on investment spending. As in the financial constraints framework, this pattern is more 
pronounced for firms which find it more difficult to credibly communicate private 
information8. The financial accelerator propagation mechanism predicts that the impact of 
financing constraints on company investment decisions is more severe during recessions, 
exacerbating and prolonging the economic downturn.  In other words, the prediction here is 
that the relationship between investment and cash flow should also be positive, but the 
novelty is that it should be stronger during recessions.  Within this macroeconomic approach, 
tests for the existence of a financial accelerator mechanism increasingly tend to combine the 
cross-section and time-series implications of the theory. This leads to compare the investment 
behaviour both across sub-samples of firms and across recessions and expansions, under the 
assumption that the investment cash flow relationship is (more) counter-cyclical for 
companies with (more) information and incentive problems9.        
                                                          
7 See Kathuria and Mueller (1995)  on  this point. 
8 The “flight to quality” of credit extended refers to the reallocation of credit from low-net-worth to high-net-
worth borrowers, in downturns. See Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996). 
9 See, for the U.S., Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994), Kashyap, Stein and 
Wilcox (1993), and, for Italy, Rondi, Sack, Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1998) and Rondi and Sembenelli 
(1998) respectively on aggregate data and panel data. 
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 Whereas the predictions of the financial accelerator and financial constraints are both 
based on the same rationale, the managerial discretion seems to predict the opposite, that the 
correlation between investment and internal finance should be stronger during booms. 
However, as noted by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996, p.5), “Jensen’s theory is 
consistent with the financial accelerator in a positive sense, as it also implies that reduced 
internal finance constraints firm spending”. In this case, insofar as the degree of managerial 
discretion is pro-cyclical, the investment-cash flow relationship should also be pro-cyclical, 
with firms reducing wasteful investment in downturns. In this respect, recessions might be 
claimed to be play a disciplinary role for firms suffering from conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders.  
 
3. Investment decisions, managerial discretion and financing constraints  in public firms  
 
In a world of imperfect capital markets with asymmetric information and agency costs, 
the literature has shown important consequences in investment decision processes, leading to 
a different pattern of predictions depending on whether firms are thought to be more afflicted 
by asymmetric information/financing constraints problems or by agency costs/managerial 
discretion problems.  This section explores how these problems apply to public enterprises. 
Although it has to be expected that even state firms have a pecking order in terms of 
cost of funds, they are generally considered “financially unconstrained” and independent of 
the availability of internal resources.  External finance for public enterprises is dominated by 
state grants and guaranteed loans, with no risk of default and no risk of bankruptcy. In Italy, 
and other countries, they are not even compelled to pay-out dividends by law. Within the 
asymmetric information/financing constraints framework (Fazzari et al., 1988), public 
enterprises could therefore be seen as the ultimate unconstrained firms (see Kaplan and 
Zingales, 1997).  And, if that paradigm holds, we should find that their investment is 
independent of cash flow.  However, in Bertero and Rondi (1997) we show that when the 
budget regime is “hard”, public firms do respond to financial incentives. An important 
consequence of that result is that public firms can only be considered financially 
unconstrained in a soft budget constraint environment.  
The finance literature shows that, in a world of perfect capital markets, private firms’  
investment projects are chosen according to the positive net present value criterion, with the 
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objective of maximising shareholders’ wealth.  But, as discussed in Section 2, when 
ownership and control are separated, private firms’ managers are able to overlook equity 
holders’ wealth and take advantage of their freedom (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  The 
consequent managerial discretion enables them to use cash flows to maximise, for example, 
their personal reputation and perquisites through empire-building (Jensen 1986).  And in a 
world of not only separation of ownership and control, but also of dispersed ownership -  i.e. 
widely held quoted firms - the literature shows that free riding shareholders exacerbate 
managers’ discretion. “The individual shareholder does not have an incentive to monitor the 
management, since the gains from improved management are enjoyed by all shareholders 
whereas the costs are born only by those who are active. Because of this free-rider problem, 
the managers of a public [quoted] company have a fairly free hand to pursue their own goals: 
these might include empire-building or the enjoyment of perquisites”10.  
This framework, once the equivalent mechanisms are identified, is of great relevance 
for public enterprises.  The equivalent for public firms of the shareholders’ maximisation 
objective is more complex and includes the combination of two objectives,  which, together, 
maximise a social welfare function.  The first is exactly the same as for private firms and is 
the  profit and efficiency motive.  The second, a direct consequence of the mandate of public 
firms (Sappington and Stiglitz, 1989), is compliance to the industrial or economic policy 
objectives - set by the government - of growth and employment maximisation and regional 
development.  An important implication of this objective, to which we come back in the next 
section, is that public investment is likely to be counter-cyclical. 
The equivalent for public firms of the pursuit of private firms managers’ own 
objectives is again more complex and made up of two components.  The first is the pursuit of 
managers’ personal perquisites, again the same as for private firms.  The second, most 
important for this paper, is the pursuit of what we call  party-political objectives, which 
should not be confused with the policy objectives above. These are the objectives that are 
driven by collusion between managers and politicians and are motivated by vote-maximising.  
They are the ones modelled in Shleifer and Vishny (1994)’s work..  Chart 1 summarises the 
private and public managers’ types of objectives. 
 
Chart 1.   Managers’ objectives 
                                                          
10 Hart (1995), p.10. 
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Managers of private firms 
 
Managers of public enterprises 
 
1.Maximisation of taxpayers’ 
wealth 
 
 
Constrained objectives 
 
 
 
Maximisation of shareholders’ 
wealth  
2. Maximisation of government 
policy objectives (e.g. employment and 
regional development) 
 
1.Maximisation of personal benefits 
 
 
Discretionary objectives
 
 
 
Maximisation of personal benefits
 
2. Maximisation of party political 
objectives (collusion with 
politicians) 
 
Two points are worth noting. Due to the multiplicity and often partly-conflicting 
objectives that it entails, the maximisation of social welfare is more complex than the 
maximisation of shareholders’ wealth.  The interesting consequence, from this study’s 
perspective, is that the discretion in the hand of public firms’  managers has more dimensions 
than that of private firms managers11.  Multiple and unclear objectives, complex performance 
measurements, greater choice of determining primary and secondary goals, all allow more 
room for manoeuvre and a greater temptation to pursue party political aims.  To 
counterbalance this, it should be pointed out, however, that public managers’ discretion is 
greater in setting goals, but more limited in choosing strategies (Aharoni, 1981).  Unions 
pressures, price controls, compulsory choice of domestic suppliers - often other state-owned 
firms - constraints in expanding in certain sectors and in the location of investments, reduce 
their strategic discretion. 
                                                          
11 For example, it is interesting to notice that the maximisation of growth satisfies different objectives for 
managers of private and public firms.  Whereas for private firms’  managers, in the standard finance 
literature, growth maximisation is only equated with empire building and excessive managerial discretion, 
the pursuit of growth for public firms managers is often part of the maximisation of social welfare.  So, it is 
sometimes difficult to disentangle when growth for state firms maximises taxpayers’ wealth or managers’ 
private benefits and when these two objectives are in conflict. 
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A second point worth noting is that public firms’  managers, exactly like managers of 
widely held firms with free riding problems, also enjoy little  direct monitoring by the owners 
of the firm.  However, this is due to an extreme form of dispersed ownership, to the fact that 
taxpayers, the ultimate owners in the chain of principals of state-owned firms, are unable to 
exercise directly their ownership rights (see Tirole 1994).  Although taxpayers are the 
ultimate financial owners of public firms, in the interest of whom social welfare and wealth 
are maximised, they can have a say on public firms choices only indirectly, by electing a 
government which, itself, acts as principal for state-owned firms12.  Given the lack of 
contractual property rights, taxpayers therefore do not exercise any direct control on 
management and have to leave monitoring to other institutions.  This, as in the case of widely 
held private firms with free riding problems, results in a greater likelihood of abuse of 
managerial discretion13. 
In conclusion, although public firms operate under a more complex set of objectives, 
the discretion managers enjoy - and the possibility of abusing it – is, in substance, similar to 
that of private firms’ managers. 
 
 
 
 
4.  Italian public firms, managerial discretion, financing constraints and budget regimes 
 
Italian public enterprises14 are of particular interest for the study of managerial 
discretion and collusion between public managers and politicians. Indeed, Italian public 
enterprises were set up as a system of state holdings, as opposed to being the outcome of 
sweeping nationalisations.  This was done partly to guarantee independence of managers from 
the political system and to protect the quality and degree of managerial discretion.  Whereas a 
nationalised industry is a direct instrument of government policy operating outside market 
                                                          
12 Although, to be precise, the government ownership rights are exercised, in turn, through multiple principals 
in the form of different ministries (see Tirole 1994). 
13 See Bertero (1998).  
14 As in other European countries, public enterprises in Italy play a major role in the economy accounting for 
around 15 percent of the non-agricultural labour force, 20 percent of value added and 25 percent of fixed 
investments (1991 data).  The public sector controls around 70 percent of banking assets and has a major 
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rules, Italian state holdings were meant to operate within market conditions, in competitive 
sectors and (in some cases) with the equity participation of private shareholders.  
Consequently, managers were outsiders with respect to political circles and meant to concern 
themselves primarily with profitability and efficiency (Barca, 1997, p. 548).  The economic 
and public policy objectives were added by the government and had to be incorporated into 
final decisions (Saraceno, 1977). The interaction between managers’ and government 
objectives is summarised by Grassini (1981): “In general parliament decides a policy, 
provides funds and sets a limit on the extent to which a state-owned firm can try to maximise 
its profits”.  In this initial setup, the scope for abuse of managerial discretion and related 
collusion with politicians was limited. 
The legal setup of state holdings reflects these principles.  Italian public ownership is 
organised in state-owned holding companies, in turn with controlling interests in diversified 
sub-holdings.  These own individual enterprises, in some cases with minority private 
shareholders (see Chart 2). The sub-holdings are mostly incorporated as private joint-stock 
corporations, are governed by private commercial law, follow a private accounting system 
and operate in a variety of competitive industries.  The database for empirical investigation is 
put together from the balance sheets of a sample of these individual firms. 
From the point of view of the quality and quantity of abuse of managerial discretion, 
we split the history of Italian public enterprises into three distinct periods: 1930s-1960s, 
1970-1987, 1988 until now.  During the first period public firms were by and large profitable 
and operated as described above. Abuse of managerial discretion, either as pursuit of private 
benefits or as pursuit of party political objectives, was rare.  Direct public intervention started 
in the 1930s with a number of rescue operations of distressed banks and of the manufacturing 
firms these banks owned (see De Cecco and Giavazzi, 1993 and Barca, 1997).  The idea was 
to restructure firms and banks as parts of a new, diversified holding company (IRI, Institute 
for Industrial Reconstruction) and then, eventually, reinstate private ownership. Saraceno 
(1977) makes the important point that “the political justification of this action was neither the 
intention to put a stop to private monopolies nor to give an impetus to certain industrial 
productions nor to develop depressed areas.  Instead, the inability of the private sector to 
supply the risk capital required for controlling important industrial enterprises from sources 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
presence in many industries, services and, of course, utilities. Parts of this section draw from the institutional 
analysis in Bertero and Rondi (1997). 
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other than commercial banks was the compelling factor for government intervention. (...)  
Thus, a certain pragmatism became associated with the state-held enterprises that was to 
remain for the life of the system”.  After World War II, the original rescue plan was extended 
to promote reconstruction and to a full industrial policy plan of direct intervention. Two other 
holding companies were created, ENI (oil and gas sector) in 1953 and EFIM (mechanical 
engineering and mining sectors) in 1962. An extensive literature, particularly by British 
scholars, such as Shonfield (1965), Posner and Wolf (1967) and Holland (1972), praised the 
management of these firms for their substantial contribution to the recovery of the Italian 
economy after World War II and also, paradoxically, for reinforcing competition (Martinelli 
1981).  The establishment in 1956 of a Ministry for State-Holdings with the mandate of 
spelling out the political objectives for public enterprises, was meant to separate the political 
from the profitability objectives.  The idea was to create a filter between politicians and firms 
to preserve the independence of the latter (Saraceno, 1977, p. 426; Scognamiglio, 1981).  
In the 1970s and 1980s things changed.  In the late 1960s other institutions were set up 
to reinforce that filter, but the outcome was not the one intended. For example, in 1967 an 
Inter-ministerial Committee for Economic Planning (CIPE) was established, with the mandate 
to set economic and social objectives and determine investment policy for public enterprises. 
The Ministry for State-holdings, in turn, would translate these strategic guidelines into 
operational objectives for the public holdings. 
The governance of public enterprises became excessively complicated (see Chart2) 
and whereas the institutional mechanisms through which the government/shareholder 
communicated its objectives to firms became more transparent, a party-political “hidden 
shareholder” emerged (Scognamiglio, 1981).  This, together with a deteriorating world 
economy and other factors15, resulted in a period, between 1970 and 1987, of party-political  
interference in the management of public enterprises (Nankani, 1988 and Bianchi, 1990).  
Political influence deeply affected strategic decisions, such as the location of new plants and 
appointment of top management. The 1978 law (L. 14/78) formally gave a Parliamentary 
committee the role of appointing the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of public enterprises.  
This implicitly legitimated an equal allocation of the various posts to the relevant political 
parties as the criterion for the nomination of top management (Grassini, 1980); for example, 
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by tradition, IRI and ENI, the two major state holding used to be “controlled” by Christian 
Democrats and Socialists, respectively.  All this made also the removal of top management a 
rather complicated political battle.  Consequently, between 1965 and 1980, for example, only 
three President were appointed at IRI. 
  
Chart 2.  Corporate governance of Italian public enterprises 
Individual firm
(e.g. Alfa Romeo)
Automobile industry
Other individual firms
Manufacturing sub-holding
(e.g. FiNMECCANICA)
Private joint stock corporation
State majority shareholder
Individual firm
(e.g. Motta)
Food industry
Other individual firms
Manufacturing sub-holding
(e.g. SME)
Private joint stock corporation
State majority shareholder
Financial services sub-holdings
(e.g. Banca Commerciale Italiana)
Other individual firms
Other sub-holdings
Holding (e.g. IRI)
100% state owned
Ministry of State Holdings
Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning (CIPE)
Taxpayers/voters
Government
 
The interaction of the above institutional changes and of two important characteristics 
of the post-war Italian political system -  the high stability of the governing party and the high 
instability of governments themselves – favoured a climate of corruption and collusion.  The 
succession of short-lived coalition governments, made of permutations of the same politicians 
belonging to the same large party (Christian Democrats) and a few small ones, eased the 
transfer of economic policy decisions from the elected government to the chair of political 
parties and, more importantly, to the heads of  party factions bargaining over the formation of 
coalitions (Filippi, 1975).  All this brought about wide abuse of managerial discretion, 
particularly in the form of vote-maximising investment decisions to satisfy party and party-
factions political objectives.  Moreover, in 1974, a new law for the financing of political 
parties made illegal the direct and explicit financing of political parties and factions by public 
enterprises.  Although the law aimed at preventing collusive behaviour, its effect was to 
eliminate the transparency of the financing and encourage indirect and hidden contributions 
by managers to politicians in exchange of favours. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
15 For example, following the first oil shock, political and social pressure favoured the acquisitions of further 
collapsing private companies by the holding companies, a procedure which could foster direct political 
interference and collusion. 
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By the end of the 1970s, which is when our database starts, public firms’ performance 
was characterised by poor profitability (in some cases huge losses), low productivity and high 
debt. In order to keep these firms in business, government funds were made available to state 
holdings, and redistributed to individual firms, through various sources.  Among these were 
endowment funds (fondi di dotazione), which were used to recapitalise equity or for new 
investment. Losses were also financed with new debt. This debt was provided by banks, 
mostly publicly-owned themselves. In addition, the effects of a number of ill-conceived laws 
became apparent.  An example is the 1977 law (L. n. 675/77) which required state firms to 
estimate the shadow costs (oneri impliciti) they incurred by implementing “non-economic 
objectives”.  These costs were then subsidised by the Treasury, a procedure which lent itself 
to abuse. 
It is easy to see how, during the 1970s and 1980s, given these circumstances, the 
budget constraint under which public enterprises operated became soft. Accommodating 
endowment funds, high debt, political interference and collusion between public managers 
and politicians, all contributed to create an environment that fits the Kornai (1980) definition 
of a soft budget constraint regime in a mixed economy. 
However, that soft budget regime was later put under pressure by a number of 
economic and political factors, some completely exogeneous to Italian government policy.   
The mounting level of public debt, the attempt of Italy to qualify for the European Monetary 
Union and the EU pressure to reduce state aid and to accelerate the privatization programme 
triggered major changes and contributed to new and strong financial pressure on public 
enterprises.  They also led to changes in the relationship between public managers and 
politicians16. 
As discussed in detail in Bertero and Rondi (1997), an analysis of these changes leads 
us to identify a switch to a hard budget regime in 1987. This is the first year in which the 
restructuring of Italian public enterprises included the closure of plants and lines of 
production and even the dismissal of management17.  The drastic reorganization of 
FINSIDER -   an IRI sub-holding and sector holding itself of the steel industry – and the 
                                                          
16 A combination of these factors and the unacceptable level of corruption in the overall political system, 
widely reported in the international press, led in the early 1990s to a reform of the voting system and to a 
revolution in the Italian political system. 
17 These policies, started at the end of the 1980s, resulted, during the 1990s, in new management structures and 
new procedures for the replacement of top management, based on performance and other related criteria (see 
Lo Passo and Macchiati, 1997 for evidence on management turnover in individual holdings). 
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liquidation of EFIM  - the third largest state holding – finalised in 1991, are example of this 
new policy which made public enterprises’ managers experience for the first time a threat 
similar to that of bankruptcy or take-over.  1987 is also the  year in which an appropriate 
quantitative measure of government easy financing of public enterprises, i.e. total endowment 
funds, collapsed. After reaching a peak of 1.08 percent of GDP in 1983, endowment funds 
shrank to 0.46 percent of GDP in 1985 and then collapsed to 0.09 percent of GDP in 198718.  
Our empirical work exploits the identified 1987 structural break, which provides an 
instrument for a unique natural experiment. 
 
5. The empirical methodology  
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of financial factors in investment 
decisions of a panel of Italian state-owned firms over the period 1977-1993.  This period not 
only includes the above-mentioned structural break, but also an entire business cycle, with the 
first recession occurring during the soft budget period and the second during the hard regime 
years.  Our methodology consists in estimating an empirical model of investment with added 
cash flow terms and in investigating the correlation between investment and cash flow.  We 
then explore how this correlation varies over the business cycle and across the soft and hard 
budget periods. 
For an empirical model of company investment we use an accelerator model, as 
derived from the solution of the profit maximisation problem of the firm, in the absence of 
adjustment costs on the production factors (labour, L and capital stock, K). We also start from 
a constant elasticity of substitution production function19: 
( )Y F L K L Kit it it it it= = +





− − −
, γ α β
σ
σ
σ
σ
σν
σ1 1 1
     (1) 
where Y is the firm’s output, σ is the elasticity of substitution and υ is the returns to scale 
parameter. Following Jorgenson (1963), the equilibrium condition for profit maximisation 
requires that the marginal productivity of capital stock equals the real user cost of capital, Jit . 
                                                          
18 Although in 1991 and 1992 endowment funds were increased and reached about 0.13 percent of GDP, they 
never came close again to previous levels (own calculations from data in CER/IRS 1993). 
19 This approach follows Bond, Elston, Mairesse and Mulkay (1997) and Mulkay (1997). See also Rondi and 
Sembenelli (1998) for an application on Italian private companies. 
Ceris-CNR, W.P. N°7/1998 
 
 15
Solving for Kt and taking logs, we obtain the long run equilibrium condition for the desired 
capital stock as a function of real output and cost of capital: 
k y jit it it= + + −

 −θ σ
σ
ν σ
1
       (2) 
with: 
θ σ βν
γ
σ
σν
=
− −
log 1  
where kit  is the log of capital stock, yit is the log of real output and jit is the log of real cost of 
capital . 
 To ensure proportionality between capital stock and demand, we must either assume  
υ=1 (constant returns to scale) or σ=1 (unit elasticity of substitution). With constant returns to 
scale and  σ=0, (a Leontief type production function), we have the simple accelerator model, 
where the capital is not affected by the user cost of capital. With unitary elasticity of 
substitution, the CES production function approximates a Cobb-Douglas production function 
and the capital stock depends positively on demand and negatively on the cost of capital. 
Taking first differences, and assuming that ∆kit can be approximated by the investment rate 
Iit/Kit, we obtain the basic investment equation 
I
K
y jit
it
it it= −∆ ∆σ          (3) 
 To account for slow adjustment of the actual capital stock to the desired capital stock, 
we then add dynamics to the basic equation in the form of lagged investment rate (It/Kt) and 
lagged growth rate of real sales (∆yit ), and assume that the variation in the user cost of capital 
is captured by time-specific, αt, and firm-specific, αi, effects. The basic specification is then: 
I
K
I
K
y y yit
it
it
it
it it it i t it= + + + + + +−
−
− −β β β β α α ε1 1
1
2 3 1 4 2∆ ∆ ∆    (4) 
to which we add the current and lagged cash flow to capital ratios (Cit/Kit) to test for the 
presence of financial effects, and future levels of real demand (proxied by the log difference 
of production in two-digit NACE industries, ∆yjt) to control for the firm’s investment 
opportunities20:  
                                                          
20 As it is well known, much of the debate over the role of cash flow for investment is about the fact that cash 
flow may also be a forecasting variable for future investment opportunities. The standard approaches to 
isolate the role of cash flow are to use the Tobin’s Q (but only for quoted firms) or directly estimating the 
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  (5) 
In the econometric section we use this adjusted accelerator model allowing the 
coefficient on cash flow to vary across the soft and hard budget regime periods described in 
Section 4.  Moreover, as public enterprises are often required to undertake counter-cyclical 
investment projects, we also test for parameter constancy across the business cycle. This 
enables us to check whether the financial accelerator’s prediction – that in the presence of 
financial constraints the investment/cash flow relationship is counter-cyclical - holds for 
state-owned firms. 
 
6. Data and descriptive statistics 
  
The database we use for estimation purposes is an unbalanced panel constructed at 
CERIS using the balance sheet data collected by Mediobanca investment bank21.  The original 
panel includes 1318 manufacturing companies, 150 state-owned and 1168 privately owned, 
over the period 1977-1993, for a total of 1300 and 9927 firm-year observation, respectively.  
It includes only firms with at least five consecutive observations, so that each firm has a time 
series of at least five and at most seventeen years. 
Firms are classified according to their ownership, which can change over time in 
either direction, from state-owned to private or viceversa (i.e. the firms are allowed to transit 
between private and public ownership). Moreover, each firm is allocated to its primary 
industry defined according to the three-digit NACE-CLIO classification.  Finally, whenever a 
major operation occurs such as mergers, acquisitions, or divestures, by construction the panel 
drops the observation for that year and breaks up the time series because that observation is 
unlikely to be comparable with the previous and following one.  It is therefore reasonable to 
assume that changes in output, employment and fixed capital are not artificially affected by 
these factors. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Euler equation for capital stock. See also Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) for a methodology which 
constructs an alternative measure of Q, called “fundamental Q” by using VAR forecasts.   
21 For a complete description of the database see Margon et al. (1995).   
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For our empirical work, we separate a sub-sample of state-owned enterprises from this 
database. The sub-smaple consists of 146 companies and 1256 firm-year observations22. 
Table A1 reports the number of state firms by years of observation. 
Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics for the main variables for this panel of firms 
for the entire period, for each sub-period (soft and hard budget constraint periods) and for the 
upturns and downturns of the business cycle.  
As described in Section 4,  we choose 1987 as the turning point for the shift from soft 
to hard budget regimes.  We define a recession as the period in which the annual rate of 
change of the industrial production in Italy is negative.  As mentioned in Section 5, our  
sample includes two recessions, in years 1981-1982 and 1991-1993. We define the remaining 
years as expansion years. On the basis of these definitions we construct the time dummies to 
be used in the econometric analysis: SOFTt, HARDt  RECt, EXPt, REC1t, REC2t . 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the investment to capital stock ratio (I/K), 
the cash flow to capital stock ratio (CF/K) and the short and long term financial debt to 
capital stock ratio (D/K). A comparison of investment ratios across different periods shows 
that the requirement for public firms to invest counter-cyclically (see Section 3) is confirmed 
by the data. Except for firms in the first quartile, the investment ratio is higher during the 
recession years, especially for highly investing companies. Differences between soft and hard 
regimes are not particularly informative, with the median increasing during the hard years, but 
the third quartile decreasing in the same period.  More interestingly, the comparison between 
the earlier and the later recession (in the soft and in the hard years, respectively) shows that 
the investment rates were much lower in the second downturn. This suggests that the shift in 
regime had an important effect on the decision to pursue counter-cyclical investment policies, 
with public firms not performing their counter-cyclical role as they did before.      
Turning to the cash flow to capital stock ratio we find that Italian state firms are in 
line with the well-documented, general poor performance of public enterprises.  The median 
cash flow rates are low and the first quartile ones are negative in every sub-period. However 
the third quartile cash flow rates are satisfactory23.  As expected, the cash flow rates decrease 
in the earlier recession, but, interestingly, not in the later recession. Finally, in the hard budget 
constraint period, state firms appear to perform better than in the soft period.  
                                                          
22 Four firms were dropped because, after the separation from private firms, they did not meet the five 
consecutive years requirement.  
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The debt to capital stock ratio for the entire period confirms that Italian public firms 
tend to be highly leveraged. The debt ratios are highest during the recessions, especially the 
first one. However, as mentioned above, the statistics show that the less leveraged firms of the 
first quartile, decrease their debt ratios during the hard budget years and even further during 
the second recession. This might indicate that restructured public firms used internal 
resources to repay debt. 
 
7. Empirical results 
 
 In this section we present the results of the estimation of the accelerator model of 
investment with additional cash flow terms. To control for future profit opportunities we also 
add future levels of real demand as proxied by the log difference of production in two-digit 
NACE industries (see Section 5, equation (5)).  
 For estimation we use the DPD program by Arellano and Bond (1988, 1991), designed 
for dynamic panel data. Table 2 reports the results from the Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) first-differences one-step estimator, which eliminates the firm-specific effects by 
first-differencing the equations and then uses lagged values of endogenous variables as 
instruments24. To check for absence of serial correlation in the residuals, we use the M1 and 
M2 tests for first- and second-order correlation (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and report them for 
all equations. If the error term in levels is serially uncorrelated, after first-differencing,  first-
order, but not second-order serial correlation, is to be expected and instruments dated t-2 and 
earlier should be valid. If we find second-order serial correlation, then only instruments dated 
t-3 are valid. To control for correlation between the instruments and the error term, we also 
report a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions (Sargan, 1958 and Hansen, 1982). In all 
equations we add time dummies to capture, among other things, the variation in the user cost 
of capital (see Section 5).  
 In Table 2, column (1), we present the GMM one-step estimates for the basic 
specification, as outlined in equation (5). The lagged dependent variable and the 
contemporaneous accelerator term (real sales growth rate) are both positive and not far from 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
23 For a consistent comparison with the private firms in the same database see Rondi and Sembenelli (1998).   
24 We treated all right-hand side variables as potentially endogenous in the investment equation. As instruments 
we used variables dated t-2 and t-3.  
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significance (p-values are 12% and 10% respectively). The future levels of demand are also 
positive, as expected. 
From this paper point of view, the interesting result is that the estimated coefficient on 
the current cash flow to capital stock ratio is positive and significant (whereas the coefficient 
on the lagged cash flow term is positive but not significant). This shows that the sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow characterises not only private firms, but also public enterprises. As 
outlined in Section 2, the finding of a positive correlation between investment and cash flow 
is consistent with two explanations. On one hand, under the assumption of information 
asymmetries in the capital markets, the positive coefficient may reveal that state firms face 
financing constraints when they have to resort to external finance, leading them to under-
invest. On the other hand, under the assumption of managerial discretion, it might suggest that 
state managers with ample discretion - obtaining their private benefits from both empire-
building and collusion with politicians - are strongly motivated to over-invest in growth. 
One way to distinguish between these two hypotheses is to investigate whether the 
role of financial factors for state companies’ investment changes with macroeconomic and/or 
political conditions. Our research strategy consists in allowing the cash flow coefficient to 
vary over time and test ex-ante expectations on its sign and size over different periods. First, 
we test for changes over the business cycle.  The fact that our sample period (1977-1993) 
covers a complete business cycle, including two recessions, enables us to test the predictions 
of the financial accelerator hypothesis, under the assumption of asymmetric information and 
financial constraints, i.e. that the relationship between investment and cash flow is counter-
cyclical. We then consider that over the same period the budget constraint for state firms 
shifted from a soft to a hard regime (see Section 4). This allows us to test whether investment 
decisions were affected by the shift in the regime, possibly throwing some light over the 
nature of the capital markets imperfections for public enterprises in the two periods. 
 In column (2) we allow the current cash flow coefficient to vary over the business 
cycle. The cash flow term is thus interacted with two year dummies. The recession dummy, 
RECt, takes the value one for the years 1981, 1982; 1991, 1992,1993; the expansion dummy, 
EXPt, is one in all other years. If the financial accelerator story holds, we should find that the 
cash flow coefficient is significantly larger in downturns. Our results show that the recession 
cash flow coefficient (CF/Kit RECt) is positive and larger than the one for the expansion years, 
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but not significantly larger (t = 0.07).  More importantly, our results also show that the 
coefficient for the expansion years (CF/Kit EXPt) is the only one to be positive and significant. 
 In column (3) the cash flow to capital stock ratio is interacted with two year dummies, 
one for the soft and one for the hard budget regime. The former takes value one from 1977 to 
1987, the latter takes value one from 1988 onwards. Here we find that the cash flow 
coefficient for the soft-budget years, CF/Kit SOFTt, is positive and significant whereas the one 
for the hard years is not significant and negative. Moreover, CF/Kit SOFTt is significantly 
larger than CF/Kit HARDt (t=1.7). This shows a significant effect of the shift in the budget 
regime on the investment decision process of state-owned enterprises. 
But what is the direction of the change? The result is just the opposite of what we 
would expect under the asymmetric information/financing constraints explanation of the 
investment cash flow relationship. That explanation would require that, as the budget 
constraint shifts from soft to hard, the financing constraints for public firms should become 
tighter and  result in a significantly larger cash flow coefficient in the hard years.  
In contrast, our findings  show a larger coefficient in the soft years. This is consistent 
with the other explanation, the agency cost one, according to which state managers have a 
considerable degree of discretion over the allocation of internal finance when the budget 
constraint is soft. Consequently, they are likely to invest cash flow not only in positive net 
value projects, but also in party-politically motivated projects. According to this explanation 
and to our results, in the soft years, state firms behaved as they were “financially 
unconstrained”- investing both free cash flow and (abundant) state grants - and in the harder 
years they gradually underwent a new discipline.  
 The result that rejects the parameter constancy across the two regimes suggests a new 
perspective for the analysis of the impact of capital markets imperfections on state 
companies’ investment decisions over the business cycle. We are in fact motivated to 
investigate further the financial accelerator, by introducing a year dummy for each of the two 
recessions (REC1t for 1981-1982 and REC2t for 1991-1993) to account for the fact that the 
former occurred during the soft budget regime whereas the latter occurred during the hard 
regime. Interestingly, this exercise also enables us to speculate on the possibility that public 
firms were not able to comply with the policy goal to invest counter-cyclically in the same 
way over the two recessions.  
Ceris-CNR, W.P. N°7/1998 
 
 21
Column (4) reports the results when we allow the cash flow coefficient to vary across 
the two recessions and the upturn. Again we find that the coefficient for the cash flow in the 
economic upturn, CF/Kit EXPt, is positive and significant. When we turn to the cash flow 
coefficients in downturns, however, we find an important difference between the recessions in 
the two regimes. The estimated coefficient for the earlier recession (under the soft regime), 
CF/Kit REC1t, is positive and significant (but not significantly different from CF/Kit EXPt, 
t=1.35). In contrast, the coefficient for the later recession, CF/Kit REC2t, is now not 
significant, negatively signed, but significantly different from CF/Kit REC1t (t = 2.3) and 
from CF/Kit EXPt (t = 2.0). Again this pattern of results seems to be in contrast with the 
predictions of the financing constraints literature.  
On the whole, the empirical findings suggest that the investment-cash flow 
relationship for this panel of state companies over time is likely to be revealing managerial 
discretion/incentive problems leading firms to over-invest during the years which we label as 
“soft”, years during which these firms were, on the whole, financially unconstrained (see 
Section 3). Consistently with this interpretation we find that the switch from a soft to a hard 
regime, results also in a change of the impact of cash flow over investment, suggesting a more 
cautious attitude of public managers towards investment decisions.  
 In so far as we provide some evidence that the investment/cash flow relationship is 
pro-cyclical (see the results for the expansion years and the recession in the 1990s) our 
findings are in contrast with the predictions of the financial accelerator. However, Bernanke, 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) themselves warn that “the mapping of the simple information-
based theories to large, publicly-held firms is less direct”. Although they are not referring to 
state-owned firms, our discussion in Section 3 and 4 shows that large publicly-held firms have 
important characteristics in common with them. 
 Table 3 reports GMM results for the accelerator model of investment as described in 
equation 5, but with an additional term, the ratio of lagged debt to capital stock. As 
highlighted in Section 2, higher leverage implies more risk of default and, in turn, a higher 
premium on external finance. This is the prediction of both the asymmetric 
information/financing constraints view and the “free cash flow” theory, which envisages in 
high leverage the disciplining device for growth oriented managers. In columns from (1) to 
(4) we present the GMM first differences estimates for alternative specifications which allow 
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the coefficients on both the debt term and the cash flow to vary over different sub-periods, 
according to the same time pattern as in Table 2.   
 The first thing worth noting is that the inclusion of a debt term does not alter the 
pattern emerging from Table 2 of estimated coefficients on the cash flow to capital stock ratio 
in any specification. Second, contrary to theory prediction, we find that in almost all of the 
estimated equations, the leverage enters with a positive, albeit small, and significant 
coefficient25. This may support the idea that state firms are “financially unconstrained” (see 
columns 1 and 2). However, most interestingly, when we allow the debt coefficient to vary 
across the budget regimes (column 3), we find that the coefficient turns negative (though not 
significant) and larger in the hard period. This is consistent with the mainstream idea that 
higher leverage should have a negative impact on investment, under the assumption of agency 
or informational problems. This result also confirms the empirical finding that, for state firms 
under a hard budget constraint, higher leverage brings about a more efficient behaviour (see 
Bertero and Rondi, 1997).      
 When we turn to the specification that classifies the two recessions according to the 
budget regime (column 4), we find that the debt coefficients for the earlier recession and for 
the expansion years are positive and significant. In contrast the coefficient on the debt term 
interacted with the second recession dummy, REC2t, is not different from zero.  This confirms 
a change in investment decisions for state firms following the shift from a soft to a hard 
budget constraint. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
 This paper extends the literature on the impact of financial factors on company 
investment to the case of public enterprises by carrying out an empirical investigation using a 
panel of Italian state-owned firms. We contribute to the current debate with econometric 
evidence on the source of the capital markets imperfections that might be responsible for the 
well-documented evidence of a positive correlation between investment and cash flow. 
 Drawing from the financial economics literature, we derive the theoretical framework 
for the analysis of company investment under the assumption of imperfect capital markets. In 
                                                          
25 Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1996) find that leverage has a negative and significant impact on investment, 
for a panel of private Italian firms.  
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particular, we dwell on the two competing explanations of the source of the excess sensitivity 
of investment to cash flow, namely the asymmetric information/financing constraints 
hypothesis and the managerial discretion/free cash flow hypothesis.  We then discuss the 
policy objectives at the basis of public firms’ investment decisions and we emphasise the 
similarities between state-owned firms and public corporations with diffused ownership.  We 
argue that, once identified the equivalent mechanisms, they could be both affected by 
excessive managerial discretion.  We interpret collusion between state firms’ managers and 
politicians as an abuse of managerial discretion and we investigate its impact on state firms’ 
investment decisions. 
 Our empirical approach consists in the estimation of an accelerator model of 
investment, with additional cash flow terms, using an unbalanced panel of 146 state-owned 
firms, over the period 1977-1993. We allow the coefficient on cash flow to vary across 
different sub-periods, testing for parameter constancy. Following an analysis of the Italian 
institutional context, we split our sample period into a soft budget constraint period (1977-
1987) and a hard budget constraint period (1988-1993). Moreover, we consider the impact of 
the business cycle on state firms’ investment to test for the financial accelerator’s prediction 
that the investment cash flow relationship is counter-cyclical.  We also explore the interaction 
between budget regime and business cycle, exploiting the fact that our sample includes a full 
business cycle with the first recession falling during the soft budget years and the second 
during the hard budget years. 
Our main results show that both the shift in the budget regime and the fluctuations in the 
business cycle have an important impact on state firms’ investment decisions. They may be 
summarised as follows:  
i)  we find that the established empirical finding for private firms that investment is positively 
related to cash flow, after controlling for future profit opportunities, holds for public 
enterprises as well; 
ii)  we find a difference between soft and hard budget regimes in the investment-cash flow 
correlation: only the coefficient in the soft period is positive and significant and it is 
significantly larger than the cash flow coefficient in the hard period (when the financing 
constraints for public enterprises should become tighter);    
iii) we find no consistent empirical support for the financial accelerator hypothesis: the cash 
flow coefficient in the upturn is not significantly smaller than the cash flow coefficient in 
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the first recession, during the “soft” years, but is significantly larger than the coefficient in 
the second recession, during the hard years. 
 Overall, our findings suggests that the investment-cash flow relationship for this panel 
of state companies is more likely to be evidence of managerial discretion problems leading to 
over-investment (especially during the soft budget period), than asymmetric information 
problems leading to under-investment, as suggested by the financing constraints literature. 
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Table 1 - Summary statistics for firm characteristics: 146 state-owned firms 
 Full Period Expansion Recessions Soft Budget 
Period 
Hard Budget 
Period 
Recession 
1981-82 
Recession 
1991-92-93 
Total Sample (1977-1993) n. obs 1110 812 298 778 332 169 129 
Estimation Sample (1981-1993) n. obs 672 429 243 424 248 135 108 
I/K        
I Quartile 0.053 0.057 0.045 0.054 0.049 0.054 0.040 
Median 0.088 0.087 0.090 0.084 0.093 0.104 0.081 
III Quartile 0.140 0.128 0.158 0.145 0.132 0.203 0.129 
CF/K        
I Quartile -0.095 -0.061 -0.169 -0.114 -0.050 -0.235 -0.093 
Median 0.033 0.041 0.014 0.021 0.046 -0.039 0.046 
III Quartile 0.096 0.097 0.089 0.098 0.093 0.092 0.088 
D/K        
I Quartile 0.319 0.318 0.322 0.350 0.256 0.383 0.215 
Median 0.614 0.586 0.712 0.637 0.569 0.762 0.620 
III Quartile 1.141 1.053 1.422 1.147 1.112 1.498 1.313 
Legend: 
 
I/K: Investment to Capital Stock ratio. 
CF/K: Cash Flow to Capital Stock ratio 
D/K: (Long Term Financial Debt + Short Term Financial Debt)/ Capital Stock  
 
Expansion: 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990. 
Recessions: 1981-82; 1991-92-93. 
Soft Budget Period: 1977-1987. 
Hard Budget Period: 1988-1993. 
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Table 2: Investment equations: 146 state-owned firms 
GMM estimates in first differences 
Dependent variable (I/K)it 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(I/K)it-1 0.133 0.135 0.134 0.157 
 (0.086) (0.089) (0.087) (0.095) 
∆yit 0.072 0.073 0.068 0.063 
 (0.044) (0.042) (0.045) (0.043) 
∆yit-1 -0.043 -0.035 -0.036 -0.039 
 (0.043) (0.049) (0.050) (0.045) 
∆yit-2 0.034 0.041 0.041 0.042 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
∆yjt+1 0.077 0.074 0.078 0.101 
 (0.066) (0.068) (0.068) (0.071) 
∆yjt+2 0.204 0.187 0.179 0.237 
 (0.143) (0.156) (0.153) (0.154) 
(CF/K)it 0.040 - - - 
 (0.014) - - - 
(CF/K)it-1 0.009 - - - 
 (0.015) - - - 
(CF/K)it· EXPt - 0.039 - 0.039 
 - (0.012) - (0.013) 
(CF/K)it· RECt - 0.044 - - 
 - (0.070) - - 
(CF/K)it· SOFTt - - 0.044 - 
 - - (0.015) - 
(CF/K)it· HARDt - - -0.073 - 
 - - (0.068) - 
(CF/K)it· REC1t - - - 0.167 
 - - - (0.096) 
(CF/K)it· REC2t - - - -0.139 
 - - - (0.090) 
     
M1 -3.242 [112] -3.383 [112] -3.345 [112] -3.951 [112] 
M2 -0.964 [  90] -0.887 [  90] -0.887 [  90] -0.920 [  90] 
Sargan 
p value 
73.036 [  72] 
(0.444) 
73.729 [  72] 
(0.421) 
74.517 [  72] 
(0.396) 
74.530 [  71] 
(0.364) 
Instruments: I/Ki(2,3), yi (2,3), C/Ki (2,3), yj (2,3) 
Legend: 
One-step estimates. Standard errors in round brackets. All standard errors are robust to time 
series and cross-section heteroskedasticity. 
M1 = Test for first order correlation in the residuals (normal distribution). 
M2 = Test for second order correlation in the residuals (normal distribution). 
Sargan = Sargan test of the correlation of the instruments with the error term (χ² distribution). 
Degrees of freedom in square brackets. 
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Table 3: Investment equations with debt: 146 state-owned firms 
GMM estimates in first differences 
Dependent variable (I/K)it 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(I/K)it-1 0.212 0.211 0.211 0.237 
 (0.081) (0.080) (0.081) (0.079) 
∆yit 0.025 0.030 0.013 0.019 
 (0.060) (0.057) (0.063) (0.058) 
∆yit-1 -0.066 -0.033 -0.060 -0.039 
 (0.059) (0.051) (0.065) (0.048) 
∆yit-2 -0.002 0.021 0.004 0.020 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.051) (0.043) 
∆yjt+1 0.055 0.032 0.044 0.062 
 (0.062) (0.060) (0.060) (0.065) 
∆yjt+2 0.193 0.118 0.148 0.173 
 (0.154) (0.151) (0.165) (0.152) 
(CF/K)it 0.064 - - - 
 (0.022) - - - 
(CF/K)it-1 0.015 - - - 
 (0.011) - - - 
(CF/K)it· EXPt - 0.061 - 0.062 
 - (0.020) - (0.020) 
(CF/K)it· RECt - 0.055 - - 
 - (0.078) - - 
(CF/K)it· SOFTt - - 0.068 - 
 - - (0.024) - 
(CF/K)it· HARDt - - -0.029 - 
 - - (0.091) - 
(CF/K)it· REC1t - - - 0.191 
 - - - (0.100) 
(CF/K)it· REC2t - - - -0.146 
 - - - (0.121) 
(D/K)it-1 0.009 - - - 
 (0.001) - - - 
(D/K)it-1· EXPt-1 - 0.009 - 0.009 
 - (0.001) - (0.001) 
(D/K)it-1· RECt-1 - 0.012 - - 
 - (0.002) - - 
(D/K)it-1· SOFTt-1 - - 0.009 - 
 - - (0.001) - 
(D/K)it-1· HARDt-1 - - -0.047 - 
 - - (0.043) - 
(D/K)it-1· REC1t-1 - - - 0.012 
 - - - (0.002) 
(D/K)it-1· REC2 t-1 - - - 0.015 
 - - - (0.112) 
M1 -3.899 [112] -4.080 [112] -4.000 [112] -3.741 [112]
M2 -0.733 [  90] -0.416 [  90] -0.296 [  90] -0.293 [  90]
Sargan 
p value 
76.162 [  73] 
(0.377) 
77.158 [  72] 
(0.317) 
75.687 [  72] 
(0.360) 
78.036 [  70] 
(0.239) 
Instruments: I/Ki(2,3), yi (2,3), C/Ki (2,3), yj (2,3), D/Ki (2,3) 
Legend: 
One-step estimates. Standard errors in round brackets. All standard errors are robust to time series and 
cross-section heteroskedasticity. 
M1 = Test for first order correlation in the residuals (normal distribution). M2 = Test for second order correlation in the residuals (normal distribution). Sargan = Sargan test of the correlation of the instruments with the error term (χ² distribution). 
Degrees of freedom in square brackets.
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Table A1. Number of firms and firm-year observation by year of observation. 
 
Years N° of Firms Firm-year obs.
17 6 102 
16 5 80 
15 0 0 
14 10 140 
13 4 52 
12 4 48 
11 8 88 
10 15 150 
9 9 81 
8 10 80 
7 19 133 
6 22 132 
5 34 170 
   
Total 146 1256 
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